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ABSTRACT
Research on physician assisted suicide (PAS) has largely been neglected by sociological
scholarship which has focused primarily on how demographic features affect support of
this contentious issue. PAS represents a unique case to contribute to sociological
knowledge on coalitions and framing, which has yet to fully understand how movement
frames change over time and what factors makes coalition activity worth the effort. The
current study addresses these gaps in the literature by studying how activist organizations
that support (right-to-die) or resist (right-to-life) PAS, frame the issue. Specifically, this
study aims to answer two research questions: (1) How do PAS social movement
organizations appeal to medical and civil rights frames over time to depict ‘good’ and
‘bad’ deaths, and (2) How do PAS social movement organizations framing of good and
bad death influence coalition activity? These questions are explored by conducting
content analyses of two-hundred randomly selected media releases from right-to-life and
right-to-die organizations from 1995-2018, in six U.S. states that have legalized PAS.
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This research finds that right-to-die movement frames have radically shifted away from
emphasizing PAS as a civil right, to representing PAS as a medical option fully
compatible with existing medical standards. Framing shifts were encouraged by a critical
external event that offered protection for PAS as a medical treatment. I argue that
transformations in framing facilitated key right-to-die medical coalitions. The right-to-die
movement’s subsequent framing of death and dying has increasingly focused on
traditional medical treatment options and the existential benefits of PAS. As a negative
case to the right-to-die movement, right-to-life frames have remained centered on a
disability rights interest and have eschewed coalition opportunities that might threaten the
stability of movement frames.
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I. Introduction
Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS) has quickly transformed from a stalled and fringe
initiative into a legitimate and successful social movement. After Oregon legalized PAS under
the Death With Dignity Act (DWDA) in 1994, it took 15 years before the next U.S. state
legalized their own versions of the law. But once Washington legalized PAS in 2009, Vermont
followed suit in 2013, and then three more states by 2017 (see Table B in the Appendix). And
between 1994 and 2005, the major right-to-die organizations would reform themselves multiple
times, with one organization lasting just a year before it finally reorganized itself for the last time
as the more successful and leading right-to-die group, Compassion & Choices. The evolution of
right-to-die organizations over this 15-year period suggests that PAS activists have struggled to
settle on consistent framing strategies. The names of organizations like The Hemlock Society
and Final Exit Network, in contrast to today’s leading right-to-die organization, Compassion &
Choices, reflect the surprisingly divergent framing tactics right-to-die groups have prioritized
over the years—on one side, suicide is boldly emphasized, while on the other a sense of empathy
and control.
And in opposing the right-to-die cause, several disability rights and faith-based
organizations emerged to resist pro-PAS legislation. Not Dead Yet! and Second Thoughts, two
leading disability rights organizations, were formed as direct responses to the passage of proPAS legislation in Oregon and Massachusetts. These and three other key right-to-life
organizations have been very successful in preventing PAS legislation from passing in Oregon
and throughout the U.S. For twelve years following the passage of Oregon’s DWDA, its
legitimacy remained tentative after a permanent injunction of the law in 1995. And although it
was reinstated in 1999, it was subject to a second injunction in 2001 by the U.S. attorney general.
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But in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Oregon DWDA deciding that medical
doctors and their state affiliations trumped the authority of the attorney general when it came to
prescribing medications for sanctioned medical treatments. The Supreme Court ruling served as
a key inflection point for the right-to-die movement which was effectively losing the battle for
legalizing PAS in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The judicial decision presented an opportunity
for right-to-die organizations to innovate new ways of framing PAS for the public. Specifically,
the Supreme Court ruling established a unique protection for PAS that encouraged right-to-die
organizations to begin building stronger and broader relationships with medical organizations
and healthcare professionals.
The study of right-to-die and right-to-life social movements therefore offers a unique
opportunity to better understand social movement framing dynamics and coalition building as
they change over time. Specifically, this case allows me to examine how movements reconstruct
frames in response to critical external events, and which in turn facilitate new opportunities to
forge partnerships and coalitions with external groups whose goals had not been aligned under
earlier movement frames. Further, the two sides of this debate— right-to-die and right-to-life—
represent contrasting positive and negative cases (respectively) for studying framing dynamics.
The data I present suggest that right-to-die organizations have substantially altered the way they
frame PAS, while right-to-life groups have maintained the same frames they initially used in the
1990s. My research therefore offers insight into why some social movements may respond to
external events and eventually build coalitions, while others do not.
Ultimately, this paper aims to better understand two key research questions through a
content analysis of 200 randomly selected media releases from seven right-to-die and right-tolife organizations:
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(1) How do right-to-life and right-to-die organizations appeal to medical frames over
time to depict ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deaths?
(2) How has right-to-life and right-to-die organizations’ framing of good and bad deaths
influenced coalition activity?
In answering these questions, I show that a dramatic shift in framing has occurred in right-to-die
media releases which are manifested through their changing ascriptions of death and dying as
‘good’ or ‘bad’, and conversely, that right-to-life organizations have not substantially changed
their framing of death and dying. I also show that coalition activity with external organizations
occurred when right-to-die groups modified existing frames in the course of external events, and
that coalitions did not occur for right-to-life groups whose frames remained centered around a
disability rights identity. I argue that coalition building with external organizations is a
consequence of key shifts in right-to-die framing that progressively medicalized portrayals of
death and dying and was encouraged by a key external event. For right-to-life groups, I argue
that a disability rights identity has deeply guided their framing of PAS and led to the rejection of
new coalition opportunities.
The rest of this paper is organized to articulate the arguments above. Firstly, I provide a
brief historical context of right-to-die and right-to-life organizations by detailing the actors
involved, their unique organizational developments, and what their social and political interests
are. Secondly, I address the location of this topic in the social movement and medical sociology
literatures. I then layout this study’s methodology and the tools used to facilitate analysis.
Finally, I conclude this paper with a discussion of the results and the implications for future
research.
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II. A Brief History of Right-to-Die and Right-to-Live
Beginnings of the Right-to-Die Movement
Political and social movements for legalizing suicide have persisted throughout American
history extending as far back as the mid-1800s, but which have consistently lacked any broad
legal or public support. The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by several failed ballot
measures in California, Michigan, Maine and Washington1, all of which aimed to legalize PAS.
But on November 8th, 1994 Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 16, the Death With Dignity
Act (DWDA), by a 51 to 49 percent margin representing the first successful PAS legislative
effort in U.S. history. The win was short lived though, as the newly instituted law was effectively
frozen. The legality of Oregon’s DWDA was immediately embroiled in persistent court battlesfirst under a temporary injunction in 1994 and then a permanent injunction in 1995.
In 1997 though, the injunction against the DWDA was lifted by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Opponents of the DWDA then appealed that decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which ultimately refused to hear their appeal leaving Oregon’s DWDA intact. Despite the
failure of right-to-life groups to maintain the injunction against the DWDA, in the summer
following its reinstatement opponents successfully lobbied for a special election to send the law
back to Oregon voters for a second time under Ballot Measure 51, a repeal of the Oregon
DWDA. Sent out in November of 1997, the repeal of Oregon’s DWDA was overwhelmingly
defeated and in March of 1998, four years after its passage, the DWDA was used for the first
time.

1

For California (Proposition 161-November 3rd, 1992); Michigan (Proposal B- November 3rd, 1998); Maine
(Question 1- November 7th, 2000); Washington (Initiative 119 – November 5th, 1991)
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But a second and conclusive lawsuit (Gonzales v. Oregon) in 2003 did finally climb its way
up the judicial ladder to the U.S. Supreme Court. And in 2006, the Supreme Court decided in
favor of Oregon’s DWDA and effectively ended any further legal challenge to the PAS law. The
right-to-die success shepherded the way for Washington to follow Oregon as the second U.S.
state to pass their own version of the DWDA in 2008. And within eight years of Washington’s
legislation four more states legalized PAS: Montana (2009), Vermont (2013), California (2015)
and Colorado (2016). With the exception of Montana, whose state courts concluded that
physicians who aid patient requests to die are protected under state constitution, every state
(Vermont, California and Colorado) modeled their own PAS laws after Oregon’s DWDA. And
Washington D.C. and Hawaii have also recently legalized PAS, solidifying the continuing
importance of this topic (see Table B in Appendix).
The steady succession of PAS legislation has been spearheaded by several organizations that
have acted in direct contest with one another. Today, seven organizations have positioned
themselves at the forefront of PAS legislation and legal battles: Compassion & Choices, the
Death With Dignity National Center, Not Dead Yet, Americans Disabled Attendant Programs
Today (ADAPT), the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, the Patients Rights Council
and Second Thoughts. While other organizations have played crucial roles on both sides of this
debate, the seven above have provided the largest financial and organizing contributions to
political action and the most consistent media releases on PAS political activities. For example,
ADAPT and NDY have become well-known as organizing arms of the disability rights and antiPAS movements (CBS NY 2019; Weil 2013). Conversely, Compassion & Choices has provided
substantial legal support to cases that sustain PAS, often submitting court dockets in their name.
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In Colorado alone, Compassion & Choices provided nearly four-million dollars toward
organizing efforts to legalize PAS (Brown 2016).

Right-to-Die Organizations
While proponents of right-to-die legislation argue that euthanasia and PAS are markedly
different, they do have relatively similar philosophies: namely, that certain conditions are
undignified and worse than death. Despite right-to-die insistence that suicide is separate from
PAS, the leading right-to-die organization that championed Oregon’s DWDA was The Hemlock
Society and used as its moniker the poisonous drink that Socrates was given to kill himself (Plato
427-343BC). The death of Socrates represents an important type of suicide- Socrates was
sentenced to death by his fellow Athenian citizens for what they deemed as the moral corruption
of society and was forced kill himself with poisonous hemlock. When Socrates had the
opportunity to flee Athens and avoid execution, he remained committed to what he considered
his moral duty and legal responsibility as a true citizen of Athens. Socrates’ final act was one of
choice and especially, of human dignity. This distinction between choosing suicide or choosing
to live in undignified circumstances remained a prominent theme for the early framing efforts of
PAS advocates.
Eventually though, the Hemlock Society was recast nearly twenty-three years after its
formation in 1980, when it reorganized itself into End of Life Choices in 2003. Just one year
later, End of Life Choices merged in 2005 with another right-to-die organization, Compassion in
Dying, leading to the more enduring Compassion & Choices. According to the organizations that
split away from Compassion & Choices, these mergers and reformations were the result of
internal divisions stemming from disagreements over strategies to legalize PAS. The partitions
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spurred more radical members to establish what is today called Final Exit Network, an
organization founded by the head of what had been The Hemlock Society – Derek Humphry.
Humphry remains a controversial figure in the assisted suicide debate and is well covered by the
news media (Reinhold 1990; Abrams 1991).
As founder of The Hemlock Society and End of Life Choices, Humphry was essential in
guiding activism for both organizations. And according to Final Exit Network, right-to-die
organizational splits and mergers were the result of a critical PR issue- the hemlock plant that
remains vividly associated with the story of Socrates, really symbolizes a voluntary form of
destructive suicide. The Hemlock Society’s slogan for 23 years was ‘A Good Life, and a Good
Death.’ In following through with their original mission, today Final Exit Network recognizes
“the need NOW for compassionate support and death with dignity education in all states” and
“does not concern itself with politics, leaving that to experienced groups like Death With Dignity
National Center and Compassion and Choices” (Final Exit Network 2019). As the more radical
wing of the right-to-die movement, for those seeking ‘self-deliverance’ they provide information
and ‘services’ through ‘Exit Guides,’ despite illegality. Making a significant departure from
other right-to-die organizations, Final Exit Network still emphasizes its willingness to assist
people who are not terminally-ill. For example, their organization also ‘guides’ those with
Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s, AIDS, muscular dystrophy, emphysema, disabling stroke, etc.
And Final Exit Network’s most recent news coverage describes the organization’s conviction in
a Minnesota district court for assisting suicide and interfering with the scene of a crime
(Majchrowicz 2016). In the years following the internal split of the right-to-die movement, Final
Exit Network has largely abandoned any concern for cultivating public appeal or finding allies
among the medical establishment, leaving Compassion & Choices and the Death With Dignity
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National Center as the primary organizations that lead pro-PAS legislative efforts across the
country.
The second major right-to-die organization promoting PAS legislation is the Death With
Dignity National Center. Founded in 1995 as the Death With Dignity Legal Defense and
Education Center, the organization shortened its name in 2003 to Oregon Death With Dignity,
and one year later merged with a California based organization, Death With Dignity National
Center, adopting that name, dissolving its chapter in California, and ultimately headquartering in
Portland, Oregon. This organization was instrumental in the legal defense of the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act when it was enjoined from 2001-2006, submitting court dockets and providing
legal resources that proved successful. The right-to-die group has similarly provided assistance
to other state-level organizations in Vermont, California and Washington- all of which have
passed PAS legislation successfully. Together, Compassion & Choices and the Death With
Dignity National Center represent the primary right-to-die organizations in the U.S.

Emergence of Right-to-Life Opposition
Opposition to PAS initially started with religious-right organizations, primarily consisting
of the Catholic Church and the National Right to Life Committee. The temporary and permanent
injunctions against Oregon’s DWDA in 1993 and 1995 (Lee v. Oregon) were submitted in part
by the general counsel for the National Right to Life Committee, James Bopp Jr., who served on
behalf of some of the plaintiffs (Hillyard and Dombrink 2001:121; Biskupic 1997). However, by
1996 the disability rights organization, Not Dead Yet (NDY), had formed as a direct result of
Oregon passage of the DWDA. NDY articulated a position against suicide that is characteristic
of most anti-PAS arguments- that is, opposition to medical and societal paternalism (Scaccia
2010). They argue that the medical establishment should not have the power to judge the value
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of a life and caution the public against legalizing PAS to prevent dangerous slippery-slope
scenarios. Considering this point to be a fundamental difference between right-to-die and rightto-life moral values, Not Dead Yet (NDY) has sustained broad countermovement activity across
the U.S. and particularly in Oregon, Washington, California, Vermont, Colorado, and
Washington D.C.
NDY’s partners in activism include four other right-to-life organizations. One of them,
Americans Disabled Attendant Programs Today (ADAPT), has contested PAS legislation across
the U.S. and has deeper political roots stemming from their 1970s advocacy for the
transportation rights of persons with disabilities (Shapiro 1994:330). ADAPT’s most recent
efforts have aimed at preventing the legalization of PAS under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) in Washington, D.C., but their coalition efforts with NDY have taken place in
Vermont, California, and Colorado. And under the general guidance of NDY and ADAPT, two
other right-to-life organizations have emerged in more recent battleground states: Second
Thoughts and the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF). Like ADAPT,
DREDF has been involved in disability rights activism since 1979 (DREDF 2019) and over the
past 14 years has partnered with NDY and ADAPT multiple times (DREDF 2005). Similarly, the
right-to-life group, Second Thoughts, formed in 2012 with the direct help and support of both
NDY and DREDF to resist right-to-die legislation and extensively covers right-to-life political
activity. And lastly, the Patients Rights Council has provided consistent resistance to right-to-die
organizations for over 32 years. Organized in 1987 as the International Anti-Euthanasia Task
Force, they eventually reformed as the International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide, and today are known as the Patients Rights Council. They have been active participants
in critical legal battles involving PAS legislation since Oregon’s DWDA (Hillyard and
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Dombrink 2001: 260). In all, five major right-to-life organizations have taken the lead in
resisting right-to-die efforts in the U.S: Not Dead Yet, Americans Disabled Attendant Programs
Today, Second Thoughts, the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund and the Patients
Rights Council.

Medical Organizations
In addition to the right-to-die and right-to-life organizations, physicians and medical
interest groups have emerged as key figures of authority in the PAS debate. But official surveys
within the medical community indicate that physicians are divided in their support for PAS
legislation. By some estimates, nearly half of all physicians disagree with or would be unwilling
to provide life-ending treatment should it be requested. What’s more, other surveys find that the
majority of physicians would be unwilling to provide such services even if they were legalized
(Craig et al. 2007; Lee et al. 1996; Cohen et al. 1994). And yet, as of December 2, 2017,
physician organizations like the Massachusetts Medical Society (MMS) overturned their
previously held opposition on PAS in response to increasing physician support for the practice.
The resulting policy decision opted-out of the PAS debate and instead favored physicians’
neutrality on the issue. With the exception of Washington state, the largest medical associations
in Oregon, California, Vermont, Colorado and Washington D.C. have adopted neutral stances
with similar justifications to the Massachusetts Medical Society.
Because physicians are the only ones who can prescribe fatal medications through death
with dignity legislation, they are the true gatekeepers that any request for PAS must pass
through. The framing that right-to-die organizations must appeal to is therefore two-fold: it
attempts to convince the voters who ultimately pass legislation, as well as the medical
community who must be complicit in prescribing lethal medications. Medical associations’
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neutral stances have therefore made it possible for right-to-die groups to engage medical and lay
audiences in conversations about the role of PAS in death and dying, especially in contexts
where science and medicine fail to offer the certainty of a painless death. However, medical
organizations continue to remain (at least publicly) steadfastly brief about PAS. And a
preliminary exploration I conducted of medical association’s press releases covering PAS only
captured terse descriptions of their official positions—namely, that of neutrality or prohibition.
For this reason, medical associations were not included in the analysis.

Key Organizations
In summary, the PAS movement has developed into a contentious social issue with seven
key right-to-die and right-to-life organizations establishing a dominant public and political
presence in five states – Washington, Vermont, California, Colorado and Washington D.C. Two
enduring organizations make up the right-to-die movement: Compassion & Choices and the
Death with Dignity National Center. And five organizations have guided the oppositely
positioned right-to-life movement: Not Dead Yet (NDY), American Disabled Attendant
Programs Today(ADAPT), Second Thoughts, the Patients Rights Council, and the Disability
Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF). This paper aims to better understand how these
key organizations have distinguished PAS as good or bad over time, and how building
relationships with external organizations has been affected by changing social movement frames.
In exploring how these key organizations’ frames have changed over time, two areas of
scholarship are critical to my analysis: (1) scholarship which investigates the role coalition
activity has on social movement frames and (2) scholarship on how the institution of medicine
affects public understandings of death and dying.
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III. Social Movement and Medical Sociology Literature
Framing
The process of framing has been studied by social movement scholars who have
described it as the “struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and
meaning” (Snow and Benford 2000: 613) surrounding political events, the use of objects, or
other social problems more broadly. The aim of this appropriation over meaning is to “mobilize
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists”
(Snow and Benford 1988: 198). Ideally, these frames resonate with target audiences and
convince them that a particular perspective on a social issue is worthy or just. Benford and Snow
(1988) have outlined three framing processes that are essential for mobilizing potential activists:
(1) that organizations diagnose social problems which require action from potential activists, (2)
that plans of action be drafted which ‘cure’ the essential issue, (prognostic framing) and (3) a
general call to arms that prepares social movement members to correct the social problem
(motivational framing).
In the case of the right-to-die movement, mobilization frames have presented new
diagnostic frameworks of terminal illness that are generally congruent with medical principles
and ethics. For example, one of the frames that PAS advocates build-up emphasizes the
reduction of patient suffering. Such tactics have similarly been described by social movement
scholars as frame-amplification, which situate “…mobilization appeals in the language of
cherished [medical] principles” (Snow et al. 1986:469). Similarly, ‘motivational framing’
strategies encourage activists to participate by mustering “vocabularies of severity, urgency,
efficacy and propriety” (Benford and Snow 2000:617). Lastly, Snow and Benford (1988:208)
have also identified a series of constraints for frames that speak to whether they will resonate
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with participants: (1) what they term ‘empirical credibility’, (2) experiential commensurability,
and (3) narrative fidelity. Together, these constraints suggest that the effectiveness of frames are
bound to their everyday relatability with an issue and/or its proposed solutions, as well as to the
degree with which frames have coherence with prevailing cultural ideologies.
But while research has explored the theoretical underpinnings of how frames mobilize
participants, it has not widely explored how coalitions with external organizations are influenced
by social movement frames. Each organization can have a unique frame for mobilizing activists
and it remains unclear how the merging or partnering of organizations consolidate their separate
frames with one other, or how frames change over time. Do movements hybridize their frames in
equal transactions? Or do certain frames win out more than others? And particularly, what
factors might be involved in the rejection of old or new frames? Two studies in particular
illuminate aspects of this unexplored area.

Coalitions and Framing
Again, very little research has investigated the role of coalitions in shaping social
movement frames. But one study by Andre Magnan (2008) performed a content analysis of key
documents, newspaper articles and media statements related to coalitions made by groups of
farmers contesting the introduction of genetically modified (GM) wheat. Megnan focused on
how frame coherence is achieved among diverse organizational interests. Theoretically, this
work is informed by a neo-Gramscian approach to counter-hegemonic processes and how those
contesting hegemonic ideologies achieve success with contentious frames. The author concluded
that frames among allied anti-GM wheat organizations encouraged ‘lowest common
denominator’ frames, whereby the original movement frames were ‘distilled’ into simpler ones
as social movements combined forces. In this way, more complex and broader appealing frames
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were difficult to achieve as groups bonded together. And particularly, the organizations which
banded together were ultimately unable to effectively challenge the more systemic agrofood
relations involved in the GM wheat debate.
Another critical study by Marc Dixon and Andrew W. Martin (2012) measured the
impact that external allies and political threat had on unionization activity. Their analysis sifted
through newspaper and media coverage of union strikes and determined that coalition efforts
among union organizations were common, but that they did not form coalitions outside of their
internal union-firm networks. Additionally, the perception of threat was crucial for whether
unions formed coalitions. Surprisingly, it was the more immediate threats to political success that
were correlated with less coalition activity. The authors further concluded that they were unable
to address a critical feature of coalition work: what makes the mobilization of external allies
“worth the effort” (Dixon and Martin 2012: 964)?
Ultimately, research on coalitions and framing has uncovered important processes
regarding social movement success and frame consolidation. But research has yet to understand
how those framing processes are influenced by coalitions that do not contest hegemonic political
and cultural understandings, and instead work to absorb the essential ideological components of
hegemonic frames. Scholarship also has yet to fully understand what factors are involved in
making coalitions or their resultant frames ‘worth the effort.’ Research suggests that when
coalitions form, the resulting frames reduce to a set of shared ideologies. But in cases where
organizations share very little ideological similarities, like when right-to-die organizations form
coalitions with medical ethics groups, do frames still reflect a lowest common denominator? And
more critically, how are coherent frames achieved when coalitions are made between
organizations that maintain opposing ideologies?
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Medical Sociology
Research from medical sociology has somewhat unevenly investigated PAS in three
ways: (1) by studying the right-to-die movement only as it emerged in the early 2000s, (2)
strictly investigating physician or public attitudes and support towards PAS, and (3) limiting
social movement or political analyses to countries other than the U.S. (Karsoho et al 2016;
Danyliv & O’Neil 2015; Nissim et al 2009; Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al 2000). As an important
exception, Karsoho and colleagues (2016) have aimed at more broadly understanding whether
right-to-die activists represented a movement toward de-medicalization and anti-hegemonic
interests. Their study conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of 42 of the original litigants
from Carter v. Canada (the key court case which made PAS legal in Canada) and explored the
relationship between assisted suicide and right-to-die discourses regarding suffering, palliative
care, and medicine. Karsoho et al. (2016) concluded that proponents of PAS “argue that the
significance of a [PAS] regime lies beyond the legal provision of lethal medication…they
emphasize what they see to be the transformative power of physicians’ involvement in [PAS]”
(195- emphasis added). That is, proponents of the right-to-die represented an opposition to the
medical status quo, but not to increasing medicalization. Instead, Karsoho and colleagues
determined that medicine was the emancipatory medium for right-to-die activists.
What remained unexplored in Karsoho et al.’s study though, was whether right-to-die
proponents have always held medicalizing perspectives, and how right-to-die proponents have
articulated those perspectives in response to success and failure. The authors also recognized that
their contribution was primarily situated in key right-to-die proponents’ construction of end of
life suffering within medicine (Karsoho et al. 2016:194). Therefore, a gap still remains in the
literature regarding how PAS, medicine, and key concepts of death and dying are constructed by
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right-to-die organizations (not just key figures in the debate) in contexts outside of the Canadian
justice system.
As a last notable exception in the medical sociology scholarship, Daniel Hillyard and
John Dombrink (2001) have written a comprehensive account of the right-to-die movement in
their book, Dying Right. Their catalogue of the movement begins with the passage of Oregon’s
DWDA in 1994 and ends just before the U.S. attorney general enjoined it for the second time in
2001. Their account ultimately ends with the unique moralized depictions of death which are
characteristic of the PAS debate (e.g. good death and bad death). But their discussion spans only
four pages and falls short of illustrating what those moral constructions of death and dying are,
and what their significance is to the broader institution of medicine. And while they consider at
length the early prominence of religious organizations that battled against Oregon’s DWDA,
they do not fully capture what would be the eventual rise and influence of disability rights groups
within the PAS debate. For this reason, Dying Right exceptionally explores the political battle of
right-to-die and right-to-life organizations, yet leaves unresolved the role of medicine in the PAS
movement’s framing of death and dying.
As right-to-die advocates have succeeded in passing pro-PAS legislation in recent years,
they have increasingly referred to their medical coalitions. Conversely, right-to-life advocates
have continued to denounce medical interpretations of a life worth living. And yet, physician
assisted suicide (PAS) remains widely unexplored by medical sociology. Specifically, it remains
unclear how right-to-die and right-to-life groups in the U.S. context have articulated medicine’s
role in death and dying through PAS, and how depictions of good and bad deaths can represent
countervailing or sustaining forces in medicalization.
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IV. Methodology
Data and Sampling
This study contributes to sociological knowledge by primarily performing content
analyses of media releases for seven major PAS organizations: Compassion & Choices, the
Death With Dignity National Center, Not Dead Yet, Americans Disabled Attendant Programs
Today, Second Thoughts, the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund and the Patients
Rights Council. Right-to-die and right-to-life media releases were downloaded from each
organizations’ websites and stored in Microsoft Word documents. Selection of media releases
were also constrained to five U.S. states: Washington, Vermont, California, Colorado and
Washington D.C. Media releases were limited to these five states because they represent the
most recent state governments to legalize PAS, and where right-to-die coalitions have emerged.
As a result, these five states narrow the analytical lens which captures framing dynamics and
coalition activity in right-to-die organizations from 2005-20172. Media releases for right-to-life
organizations were also constrained to these states. Altogether, the total set of media releases
before random sampling included 683 documents.
To establish a reliable comparison for changes in framing that have occurred in the 20052017 post-coalition period, I have also included documentation that captures the pre-coalition
right-to-die period: five essays on physician assisted suicide written by Derek Humphry from
1995 to 2007. This set of pre-coalition material were obtained from Derek Humphry’s personal

2

As described earlier, Compassion & Choices is the organizational merging of End-of-Life Choices, and Compassion
in Dying in 2005. The Death With Dignity National Center is also the merging of two organizations in 2003: Death
With Dignity Legal Defense and Education Center, and Oregon Death With Dignity. These two groups have worked
together, both monetarily and organizationally, to defend and promote right-to-die efforts since their
consolidations. Similarly, Not Dead Yet, Second Thoughts, the Patients Rights Council and Disability Rights
Education & Defense Fund have organized activism together, often referring to each other’s blogs and protest
activity.
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website, FinalExit.org. And alongside these pre-coalition right-to-die documents, seven
randomly selected media releases by three right-to-life organizations (Not Dead Yet, Patients
Rights Council, and the Disability Rights and Education Fund) between 1995 and 2007 were
used to establish a pre-coalition right-to-life period.
Sampling proceeded by arranging the total set of post-coalition right-to-die and right-to-life
documents for each group across five U.S. states (WA, VT, CA, CO, D.C.) in chronological
order using Microsoft Excel. Documents were then assigned sequential values beginning with
‘1’, based on their chronological order. One-hundred media releases for each group, right-to-die
and right-to-life, were then randomly selected for analysis using a sequential random number
generator (https://www.random.org/sequences/). Those selected documents were then imported
into NVivo 12. In total, 200 media releases were analyzed across both groups.

Data Analysis
Coding was carried out by first reading a media release and then coding all relevant
themes that were critical to the framing of PAS. The first round of coding yielded 122 unique
categories and themes. At this point, coding schemes were either simplified by collapsing similar
and related categories, or split in cases where themes were highly prevalent. In alignment with
the research questions, particular attention was placed on uncovering themes related to coalition
work and portrayals of death and dying as good or bad. Afterward, a second round of coding was
completed to ensure the accuracy of previous coding schemes and to capture any themes that
may have been missed in the first round of coding. After the second round of coding, all coding
schemes were ultimately consolidated into 30 unique categories which were critical to
understanding how right-to-life and right-to-die organizations have framed PAS over time.

19

I have described earlier that my research questions aim to better understand how right-to-die
and right-to-life organizations present death and dying through moralized frames (e.g. a good
death, a bad death). In light of this, Hilgartner’s theoretical framework for analyzing documents
with attention to their performative and persuasive presentations of self is both appropriate and
useful. Such an analysis “explores how the protagonists in these theatrical contests work to
create persuasive performances, exploring the art and artifice they employ to foster impressions
and shape the experience of their audiences” (Hilgartner 2000: 9) This necessarily involved
coding right-to-life and right-to-die media releases for depictions of ‘Good Deaths’ and ‘Bad
Deaths’. Coding schemes then sought to uncover whether pre- and post-coalitions distinguished
what constituted good and bad deaths. Similarly, the formation of coalitions and their effect(s) on
framing were given specific attention during coding. For example, this included categorizing the
‘theater’ of coalition work which included categorizing the types of external organizations that
were discussed in media releases (religious, political, medical, etc.), the actors involved (family,
patient, doctor, etc.) and where they took place (states, institutions, hospitals, courts etc.).
Coding categories also successively reflected emergent themes and rhetoric throughout
the coding process. Some scholars have described this kind of research process as Grounded
Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2000). However, I subscribe to an orientation offered
by Timmermans and Tavory (2012) called abductive analysis. Abductive analysis is a research
process that first involves making “a preliminary guess based on the interplay between existing
theories and data when anomalies or unexpected findings occur” (179). The researcher then
compares these findings to existing theories and either verifies existing theories, or builds new
ones based on an “inductive conceptualization of this data through intensive coding.” In addition
to Hilgartner’s framework, abductive analysis has also guided data analysis.
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V. Results
In the course of coding media releases, I achieved thematic saturation3 for two distinct
periods in the right-to-die movement. Key coalition activity also emerged for medial releases in
those periods and reflected the unique shifts in how right-to-die organizations depicted the
relationship between PAS, medicine, and individuals. These coalition events are noted in the
appended Table A. Right-to-die frames between these periods shifted in two significant ways: (1)
they increasingly incorporated medical personnel on issues of death and dying, and (2)
diminished the life and death stakes surrounding PAS. I explore these transformations by
dividing the right-to-die movement into two periods: pre-coalition and post-coalition. Between
each I describe a critical external event, Gonzales v. Oregon, which I argue spurred right-to-die
framing shifts that occurred afterward. I then follow-up with a discussion of right-to-life frames,
elaborating on the stability of how these groups characterize PAS, and provide an explanation for
why right-to-life groups have rejected opportunities for coalition work.

Pre-Coalition Period
Rational Suicide
The right-to-die pre-coalition period was characterized by a set of two persistent frames: an
emphasis on individual rationalism, and a broader insistence on any individual’s liberty and
freedom to choose suicide. Media releases in the pre-coalition period established the need for
people to act on rational choices and exercise their personal autonomy in deciding what counted

3

Mario Small (2009) has described saturation as a descriptive for when qualitative data, despite not representing a
true random sample, achieves an analytically meaningful stability from the sample—at this point data begins to
reflect theoretical replication and no new unique information is gleaned from subsequent cases. In my case,
saturation meant that media releases revealed no new themes (e.g. Rational suicide, freedom to die, choice and
suicide, etc.) from prior ones and were predictive of what themes emerged in the media releases that followed.
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as a ‘quality life’. A 1995 release is emblematic and details how the ‘Question of Character’
relates to PAS. In it, Derek Humphry—founder of The Hemlock Society—describes the specific
factors that influenced his decision to assist his late wife’s (Jean Humphry) suicide:
“…the clinching consideration is whether or not the person desiring an accelerated death,
or the one asked to help, feels instinctively that it is right for them. This 'rightness' is
based on a multitude of influences, the most important being the person's life
experience…when Jean, my first wife, asked me to help her to die it came as a surprise
since we had never previously discussed the matter. It did not strike me as a shocking
option in view of her condition and nature. In fact, it seemed most sensible. She had bone
cancer, with secondaries, and her strong character always had demonstrated an ability to
think things through calmly and to make decisions right for her.” (1995)
Tellingly, the release is titled “Who Will Help Another to Die?” and further on identifies three
critical features of those who desire “self-deliverance”: (1) Loss of hope for a medical cure, (2)
A strictly personal desire to die, sans psychological illness, and (3) A specific plan for how death
should be carried out. The features he outlines highlight how right-to-die groups originally
conceived of PAS—An organized, rational decision and especially distinct from other irrational
forms of suicide (e.g. mental illness).
The emphasis on rational suicide was strikingly persistent in the pre-coalition period.
Another example from a 1996 media release highlighted the loss of control in modern society
and argued that PAS was a necessary right in order to regain that control:
“While it is true that we have no control over our births, at least we ought to have control
over our deaths. How can we claim to be free people if someone else's morals and
standards govern the way we die?...We die differently today from our forebears. In this
century, medicine has made tremendous strides towards keeping us healthy and living
longer, for which we are all grateful. But modern medicine has not entirely solved the
problem of terminal pain, and it certainly never will be able to answer the very personal
question of an individual person's quality of life” (1996-Emphasis added).
And right-to-die media releases portrayed the consequences of a world without PAS by
constructing abstract scenes of death and dying. These scenes accordingly employed rational
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actors and intimately personal judgments in determining what counted as tolerable living
conditions:
“I believe that there is a second form of suicide -- justifiable suicide, which is rational and
planned deliverance from a painful and hopeless disease. I don't think the word 'suicide' sits
too well in this context but we are stuck with it. I have struggled for twenty years to
popularize the term 'self-deliverance'…” (2000)
“Whereas modern medicine has brought great benefits to humanity, it cannot entirely solve
the pain and distress of the dying process. Each person deals with death in their individual
way. Which way is determined by their health, their ethics, and personal living conditions.
The degree to which physical pain and psychological distress can be tolerated is different in
all humans. Quality of life judgments are private and personal, thus only the sufferer can
make relevant decisions.” (2007)

As the last quote highlights, good deaths for right-to-die groups depicted empowered individuals
who accepted their terminal fate, especially when modern medicine was unable to cure their
disease or alleviate continued suffering. Frames particularly focused on promoting the concept of
‘self-deliverance’ through PAS, promoting the notion of an honorable and noble death. Such
descriptions were extremely reminiscent of Plato’s poetic description of Socrates’ death—a key
inspiration for the pre-coalition right-to-die group The Hemlock Society.
Choosing Suicide
In addition to themes surrounding rational decisions, right-to-die pre-coalition frames
emphasized the power of choosing death. These frames went beyond simply selling a logic of
suicide, and instead extolled the virtue of any person to select the time, manner, and place of
their death. One release exemplified this by defending the importance of empathy in
understanding what PAS means for those who are dying:
“In a spirit of compassion for all, this manifesto proclaims that every competent adult has
the incontestable right to humankind’s ultimate civil and personal liberty -- the right to
die in a manner and at a time of their own choosing…Each person deals with death in
their individual way. Which way is determined by their health, their ethics, and personal
living conditions. The degree to which physical pain and psychological distress can be
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tolerated is different in all humans. Quality of life judgments are private and personal,
thus only the sufferer can make relevant decisions” (2007).
Choice, personal liberty and the private nature of committing suicide are the hallmarks of precoalition frames. Right-to-die organizations attempted to persuade readers that medicine fails
those afflicted with degenerative diseases and justified suicide for any rational reasons. This
orientation is made all the more concerning when one media release explained that PAS was
necessary for the “two percent” of people who are likely to die from more prolonged and
intolerable illnesses, such as:
“There is the scourge of AIDS, which in some cases is a terrible death. More of us die of
degenerative diseases like A.L.S. (motor neuron disease), Parkinson's, Multiple Sclerosis,
Alzeheimer's Disease[sic], and Osteoporosis. These wasting diseases take years to run
their course -- sometimes 10 to 15. Our grandparents knew very little of such diseases
because they died earlier. Two out of every five of us is going to die from a degenerative
disease.” (1996)
The same release also described the ‘psychic toll’ of “loss of bowel control, haemorraging[sic],
permanent hiccups” (emphasis added) that underscored the need for a personal right to choose
suicide.
Good and Bad Death
But in naming specific diseases and symptoms in this pre-coalition period, right-to-die
media releases constructed a particular type of death- a bad one. Bad deaths were portrayed as
painful, prolonged, and medically uncertain. And in line with what many right-to-life groups
have signaled profound concern about, disability also often characterized these deaths. From a
media release in 2000, The Hemlock Society listed three reasons why PAS should be legalized,
detailing what constituted a bad death:
“1. Advanced terminal illness that is causing unbearable suffering - combined physical
and psychic -- to the individual despite good medical care. 2. Total loss of quality of life
due to protracted, incurable medical conditions. 3. Grave physical handicap which is so
restricting that the individual cannot, even after due consideration, counseling and re-

24

training, tolerate such a limited existence… there are some disabled who would, at a
certain point, rather die.” (2000)
Right-to-die media releases also reiterated the travesty of circumstances where medicine was
unable to alleviate pain except through unconsciousness and loss of self, all of which complicate
common sense distinctions between life and death:
“Fortunately most, but not all, terminal pain can today be controlled with the
sophisticated use of drugs, but the point these leaders miss is that personal quality of life
is vital to some people. If one's body has been so destroyed by disease that it is not worth
living, then that is an intensely individual decision which should not be thwarted. In some
cases of the final days in hospice care, when the pain is very serious, the patient is
drugged into unconsciousness ('terminal sedation'). If that way is acceptable to the
patient, fine. But some people do not wish their final days to be spent in that drugged
limbo.” (2000)
Ultimately, the pre-coalition period broadly framed physicians and the medical
establishment as barriers to a good death and often implied their villainy in parading false hope
to those with terminal illnesses. Death itself was framed as a nexus in which medical treatment
was ill-equipped to address personal suffering and ensure that patients retained their sense of self
at the end of life. And in this way, right-to-die groups defined a good death as conscious,
planned, painless, and de-medicalized. One of the explicit aims of the right-to-die movement in
the pre-coalition period was to make PAS a civil right which would compel medical personnel to
assist the suicides of those that wanted hastened death. Right-to-die groups argued that choosing
death was a personal liberty that doctors should be unable to block. And prominent professional
organizations like the American Medical Association (AMA) remained strongly opposed to
allowing physicians any ethical leeway to practice PAS. They maintained that PAS was an
unethical practice and “fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer… and
would pose serious societal risks” (AMA Code of Ethics 5.7). But despite the passage of the
Oregon DWDA without the help of medical groups like the AMA, PAS as a national civil right
was still a distant dream by the mid-1990s. However, right-to-die groups were presented with a
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unique success in the mid-2000s that called into question existing right-to-die frames and offered
a new pathway to success.

Gonzales v. Oregon
The years after the passage of Oregon’s DWDA retained an air of uncertainty for the
law’s legitimacy. When it passed in November of 1994, a temporary injunction was immediately
placed on the DWDA. And in 1995, the judge for the U.S District Court of Oregon, Michael
Hogan, permanently enjoined it. Right-to-die groups eventually appealed Judge Hogan’s
decision and two years later, Oregon’s DWDA was reinstated4. But the law was once again
short-lived. In 2001, the Attorney General for the Bush Administration, John Ashcroft, argued
that PAS was a fundamental violation of the Controlled Substances Act (Charatan 2006).
Ashcroft argued that the use of drugs like Morphine to hasten death were not a legitimate
medical practice and therefore were subject to regulation. But the Supreme Court would decide
in 2006, that the intent of the Controlled Substances act was not to regulate the medical
profession, but to halt drug trafficking. The court’s consensus was based on an understanding
that whatever constituted legitimate medical practices could only be determined by medical
professionals, and not political appointees. When Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court, he specified who it was that could determine legitimate medical treatments:
“In deciding whether the CSA can be read as prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, we
look to the statute’s text and design. The statute and our case law amply support the
conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using
their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however, the statute manifests no
intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally… For all these reasons, we conclude
the CSA’s prescription requirement does not authorize the Attorney General to bar
4

Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act was reinstated by a three judge panel in the U.S Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
on February 27th, 1997.
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dispensing controlled substances for assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime
permitting such conduct.”
The Supreme Court’s opinion was critical to the right-to-die movement for two essential
reasons. Firstly, the right-to-die movement had faced persistent opposition and legal set-backs
for the 12 years leading up to the 2006 ruling. And prior to Gonzales v. Oregon, the Supreme
Court ruled against two other PAS cases deciding that (1) there was no fundamental liberty
protection for assisted suicide and (2) that state bans on assisted suicide did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment rights5. Secondly, Gonzales v. Oregon represented a profound
opportunity for right-to-die organizations—if they could convince ‘medical regimes’ to permit
PAS, future legislation had been provided a fundamental protection. Gonzales v. Oregon was
therefore a critical inflection point for the right-to-die movement, which before the Supreme
Court ruling was failing under pre-coalition frames. And after this key external event, right-todie groups transformed the way they framed PAS. Beginning with the formation of Compassion
& Choices in the same year that oral arguments were heard in Gonzales v. Oregon, right-to-die
groups fundamentally shifted the way they depicted the institution of medicine in death and
dying.

Post-Coalition Period
Warming-Up to Medicine
The merging of Compassion in Dying and End of Life Choices in 2005 marked the first
right-to-die coalition activity prior to the 2006 Supreme Court ruling. The result of the merger,
Compassion & Choices, signaled an early attempt to transform how right-to-die groups presented

5

Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) was a 9-0 Supreme Court ruling that decided no fundamental liberty to assisted
suicide existed; Vacco v. Quill (1997) was another 9-0 Supreme Court ruling that decided state bans on assisted
suicide were legal and did not violate Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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PAS to the public6. The first sampled media release from the post-coalition period is
representative of right-to-die frames following the 2006 Supreme Court decision. Rather than the
legalistic descriptions of personal freedom that defined the pre-coalition period, frames began to
portray PAS as facilitating better patient-physician relationships. The right-to-die release cited
medical research published in the Journal of the American Medical Association which found that
patients who discuss approaching the end of life with their doctor have increased enrollment in
hospice, and less anxiety and depression than those who did not:
“The study confirms the benefits of Death with Dignity and Right-to-Know
laws…‘Doctors are not always straightforward about the true prognosis and offer false
hope,’ said Barbara Coombs Lee, president of Compassion & Choices. ‘As a result,
treatments can leave patients too weak to spend quality time with loved ones, rectify
relationships, or seek spiritual peace. When patients have full information about all of
their options, they are empowered to knowingly choose’ or refuse ‘difficult treatment.’”
(2008)
Early post-coalition media releases like the one above, also presented somewhat contradictory
attitudes toward the medical establishment. On one hand, they remained critical of how
physicians treated terminal patients, but they also argued that doctors were the solution, rather
than a barrier, for a better death. And physician trust only increased over time, progressively
abandoning the distrustful medical sentiment that characterized the pre-coalition period.
In establishing this right-to-die transition, an early 2010 release further illustrates how the
medical system was still framed as untrustworthy at times:
“It was clear to me, my daughter, and his niece, that he was suffering tremendously, and
we were all traumatized by watching helplessly as he died a slow and agonizing death.
Not once did any Whatcom Hospice staff mention that Norman had other options, such as
palliative sedation (sedation to unconsciousness until death) or aid in dying under the

6

As described earlier, movement leaders like Derek Humphry have described the split between Compassion &
Choices and Final Exit Network as an unavoidable division between right-to-die activists interested in immediate
action to aid those who desire PAS, and other activists who are more interested in winning the hearts and minds of
the public through PR campaigns.
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Washington Death With Dignity Act (DWDA). I learned about the DWDA the day after
Norman died.” (2010)
But this negative portrayal of physicians and medical personnel stands in stark contrast to
another 2010 media release that presented one doctor’s explanation for why PAS was becoming
increasingly popular among medical providers:
“Dr. Preston is in a unique position to comment on Death With Dignity. As a physician,
Dr. Preston understands the need for doctors to be healers, but also to end suffering for
dying patients. Preston notes that more and more physicians are realizing that ‘death with
dignity’ is a humane part of medical practice. By participating in physician aid in dying,
physicians are helping patients gain release from the agonies of extended dying. They are
staying with their patients and giving good end-of-life care.” (2010)

The virtuous physician advanced even further in another release that highlighted the political and
medical success of the Washington state Death with Dignity Act:
“Lonnie Maxfield, of Olympia, who is terminally ill with ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease),
said that the DWDA provides him with peace of mind, ‘I’m very grateful for our Death
with Dignity Act, and that my doctor respects my end-of-life choices…” (2011)
And by February of 2013, the positive framing of physicians turned into outright
reverence, as it defended the sanctity of the relationship between doctors and their patients.
Elaborating on a bill to imprison physicians assisting suicide, the right-to-die media release
extoled physicians:
“Threatening doctors with 10 years in jail for honoring a terminally ill patient’s request
for aid in dying violates the sacred doctor-patient relationship…” (2013)
The progressive warming of the right-do-die movement toward the medical establishment
indicated a clear departure from the pre-coalition period, which had made sacred the liberty and
freedom of an individual to choose death. And as right-to-die frames shifted, a new kind of
organizational partnership began to emerge—coalitions with medical groups.

29

Right to Die Medical Coalitions
In 2014, one right-to-die group made clear how they were making death with dignity a
reality in the state of Vermont. They wrote:
“So we’re developing that core group of responsible doctors, nurses, pharmacists,
volunteers and all the other people needed to make this practice viable in Vermont.
C&C recruited Linda Waite-Simpson as the new state director…Her main role is
advocacy for the law ‘making sure people understand it and can access it, educating the
entire state on what it means and that it’s available.’ That will include reaching out
broadly throughout the medical community and general public, recruiting volunteers and
enlisting participating physicians and pharmacists.” (2014)
To accomplish this ‘advocacy for law’, the right-to-die group elaborated on a critical pathway
which information about aid-in-dying would be disseminated:
“Bonnie and Peter Reagan, two Oregon physicians who participate in their state’s law,
represented Compassion & Choices when they spoke at last fall’s Vermont Ethics
Network’s annual conference, ‘Vermont’s New Normal: End-of-Life Care and Physician
Aid in Dying.’ C&C also sponsored a booth at the event. Most recently, Compassion &
Choices staff held an informational meeting with Vermont Ethics Network and Patient
Choices Vermont that detailed exactly what happens when someone calls a C&C end-oflife consultant at 800.247.7421.” (2014)
The pathway to success was direct consultation with healthcare providers and involved right-todie groups winning over the hearts and minds of medical professionals. The same release also
cited the core mission of the Vermont Ethics Network, which was to “promote ethics as a core
component of health care and health care decisions for indiviudals[sic], clinicians, health care
organizations, and the larger community” (VTEthicsNetwork 2018). That mission is made all the
easier if you consider that of the organization’s twelve board of directors, four are M.D.s, one is
a psychologist, two are R.N.s, and all of whom either practice or teach at medical schools and
some do both. Right-to-die partnerships with medical groups like the Vermont Ethics Network
highlight the key shift in pre- and post-coalition movement strategies—physicians became
central to the success of PAS in the years after 2006. Right-to-die groups in the post-coalition
period began integrating what were originally divergent frames of understanding, moving
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beyond stories of negligent medical staff who allowed people to needlessly suffer, and instead
championed healthcare professionals as the stewards of dignity.
A newsletter published by the Vermont Ethics Network in 2013 attests to the kind of
relationship right-to-die groups have developed with medical organizations. In the newsletter,
not only is Compassion & Choices listed as one of the primary resources they recommend to
anyone interested in learning more about Vermont Physician Aid in Dying, but they’re also listed
as a resource for finding a physician who is willing to fulfill the law. And in a presentation that
was coordinated by the same right-to-die group at the Vermont Ethics Network conference, the
right-to-die movement extended its influence into the realm of professional practice. Their
presentation was titled “Clinical Practice Guidelines for Aid in Dying,” and while the content
can’t be known from the media releases captured in my analysis, it does underscore the broader
right-to-die effort to develop stronger ties to the medical community.
But providing clinical practice guidelines for medical professionals represented a
fundamentally different tactic than had been attempted in the past. Right-to-die organizations
traditionally focused on informing patients of their medical rights and lobbying legislators and
assemblies to make PAS legal. And coalitions with medical organizations coincided with a rapid
transformation in what PAS signified- it was no longer a civil right or a legislative commodity,
but rather a medical treatment requiring technical understanding and clinical practice guidelines.
Once again, right-to-die groups shifted their framing of PAS so that it no longer simply aimed at
persuading healthcare providers that PAS was an essential hope for terminal patients. Rather,
right-to-die organizations now suggested that PAS could be integrated into medical practice on a
national scale. Two key framing shifts reinforced the possibility of PAS as a broadly legitimate
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medical practice: (1) an emphasis on palliative care treatments which de-prioritized PAS, and (2)
an increasing emphasis on the existential comfort PAS provided patients as a medical option.

Palliative Care and Existential Comfort
The right-to-die shift toward palliative care is best characterized in a release titled
“Nationwide Impact Grows,” that references an active partnership with the California Primary
Care Association7 and which reported ‘great progress’ for the cause. It opened with a quote from
the right-to-die group’s national director of policy and programs:
“‘Our California Access Campaign will educate and empower doctors and terminally ill
adults about all the end-of-life care options to relieve intolerable suffering, including
hospice, palliative care and medical aid in dying.’ The launch was announced during a
news conference at the California Primary Care Association (CPCA) in Sacramento. The
CPCA is among a group of health centers, hospitals, hospice facilities and nonprofit
organizations partnering with Compassion & Choices to ensure that all Californians
know aid in dying is an available and safe end-of-life option.” (2015)
Their partnership was also accompanied by a unique service, Doc2Doc, which established a free
national telephone line for physicians treating terminally ill patients. The service would provide
one-on-one consultations with right-to-die medical doctors to discuss ‘end of life options’—
particularly, options other than PAS, which is the last listed option:
“Hospice, palliative care and effective pain and symptom management.
How to follow current clinical practice guidelines.
How specific state laws affect end-of-life care.
How to communicate with patients, pharmacists and family members.
What to expect in a patient-controlled death.
How to handle patients’ inquiries or requests concerning withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment.
How to handle a badly suffering, terminally ill patient’s request for assistance in
achieving a painless, peaceful death.” (2015)

7

The California Primary Care Association is a statewide organization representing over 1,300 medical groups in
California with a mission to “leading and position community clinics, health centers, and networks through
advocacy, education and services…” (CPCA 2019).
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Another release included commentary from a palliative care physician, Danny Cox, who
elaborates on the internal conflict physicians experience when they are approached by patients
asking for PAS. In particular, Dr. Cox highlights that the ethical tension produced by these
requests are irrelevant in light of the political and cultural changes that have transformed end of
life healthcare:
“Whether or not it is good for the field, no matter what our ethical beliefs, the passage of
the law has changed things. There has been this sudden shift that we can no longer
ignore. Patients will continue to turn to us because we are experts in end-of-life care, and
this is now an end-of-life option.” (2015)
He later identifies how medical professionals can respond to such widespread pressure for PAS:
“I believe that if we provide accessible, high-quality palliative care focused on meeting
medical, spiritual, and psychosocial needs, physician-assisted death will remain an
option of last resort for our patients here in California.”

Right-to-die media releases like those above illustrate how movement frames less frequently
objected to medical norms around death and dying. Releases began to articulate PAS as
compatible with existing medical standards and incorporated medical professionals’ caution
toward PAS by insisting on its ability to strengthen mainstream medical practices. Under new
right-to-die frames, PAS was ‘an option of last resort’ that could at worst spur healthcare to
provide better medical treatment for those at the end of their life. One right-to-die release
summarizes this reorientation in framing best:
“‘Medical aid in dying harms no one and benefits even those who make no request for
end-of-life medication, by spurring conversations about all their end-of-life options,
including hospice and palliative care, and better utilization of them,’ said Dr. Omega
Silva, a retired physician and former president of the American Medical Women’s
Association and D.C. resident who has three cancer diagnoses.” (2017)

Alongside the increasing emphasis on palliative care, another theme presented—that the real
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success of PAS was when it remained unused. Media releases under this framework argued that
PAS’ real value was in its ability to provide ‘comfort.’ This approach differed from the frames of
the late 1990s and early 2000s which focused on how PAS empowered people to take control of
when and how they died. Carrying-out PAS was essential to taking back control which right-todie groups reiterated was held by medical professionals. But as PAS statistics rolled-in from
states where it was legal, they began to paint a different picture of the practice:
“Compassion & Choices of Washington (C&C)…today responded to the
Washington State Department of Health’s (DOH) report on the state’s first full
year of experience with the DWDA. A significant number of patients who
received medication died without taking it, showing the benefit of comfort and
control the law provides…The practice of aid in dying in Washington has
been infrequent, and comforts many more patients than just those who use it.
Patients have benefited from the peace of mind and comfort the law provides” (2011).
And when another report on California’s Death with Dignity law illustrated the same trend, one
right-to-die organization doubled-down on what the law was actually intended for:
“Of 258 California residents who started the end-of-life option process under the Act last
year, 191 received medication with prescriptions written by 173 doctors. While the
Department cautions about drawing conclusions from a partial year report, the data point
to what we know from Oregon and Washington: A significant portion of those who
obtain prescriptions choose not to use them: 42 percent in California (45% in Oregon).
As in Oregon and Washington, the first report out of California shows that the new
assisted dying law works as intended, providing peace of mind, comfort, and control at
the end of life to dying Californians” (2012).

Despite the reality that death with dignity legislation has always been intended to allow
people to act on PAS without criminal consequences, the shift in right-to-die framing reflected a
strategy that did more than simply deflect inconvenient statistics. By insisting that PAS provides
existential comfort ahead of control over death and dying, right-to-die organizations reinforced
the relative safety in accepting a new medical treatment that both strengthens standard end of life
options and is rarely taken advantage of. This softening of PAS ultimately diminished the life
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and death stakes surrounding its legalization, but it also made its incorporation into general
medical practice more palatable for medical professionals. The right-to-die coalition with the
California Primary Care association attests to the impact of this framing shift.

A New Good Death
In adjusting frames to focus attention on existing end of life care options and the more
abstract comfort PAS could provide terminal patients, right-to-die organizations radically
reconstituted what a ‘good death’ represented. The general pattern of right-to-die framing in the
post-coalition period concluded that PAS was just one option out of many at the end of life. And
consistent with these broader changes, a good death became a more deliberative and even
cautiously contemplative healthcare process. Two recent releases illustrate this shift:
“This [Washington D.C] bill allows someone who is on death’s doorstep the option to choose
a peaceful death- to decide in one’s final moments, when the illness is terminal and death is
imminent, how he or she will face the end,” said Councilmember Mary Cheh (D-Ward 3), the
bill author. “It is a choice among many one could make…”” (2016)
“Wolf Breiman, whose cancer prompted him to publicly support legislation to give
terminally ill Californians the option of medical aid in dying, died peacefully from
pneumonia on December 31. He passed away at a hospital, while surrounded by his wife,
Debbie Diamond, family and friends. He was 89… Before the End of Life Option took effect,
he told to the Ventura County Star: “life is no longer a choice for me. That choice is no
longer there. I can choose only how to die.” Wolf planned to obtain the medication as soon as
he met the law’s requirement of having six months or less to live. Then, he would decide if
and when to use it.” (2018)

And in a relatively recent reversal of longstanding movement frames, the last example above
notes an emerging context for post-coalition death and dying—hospitals. For comparison, a
right-to-die release from 2016 highlights the idealized context of a good death before the
presence of hospitals. The release describes the staging of one terminal patient’s death, Brittany
Maynard. It describes how the course of her disease has made the simple act of breathing painful
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and deprived her of all energy. Maynard concludes the interview with a solemn resolve that she
‘is ready’:
“After completing the request process [for PAS] she invited her closest friends and family for
a farewell party. Together, they laughed and cried as they shared memories and stories. A
week later, she gathered a handful of people closest to her, laid down on her bed, and drank
the liquid medication. She soon fell asleep, and not long after, she died.” (2016)

In all, a dramatic transformation occurs between the pre- and post-coalition periods of the
right to die movement. This shift in framing progressively medicalized PAS through portrayals
of death and dying that increasingly eschewed the prominence of choosing death or exercising a
‘right to commit suicide.’ Right-to-die groups instead embraced more personally deliberative and
medically cooperative approaches to PAS and was resituated in a broader medical approach that
complimented existing treatment standards. To that end, the framing of a good death today
contradicts pre-coalition constructions of death and dying by stressing the centrality of medicine
in facilitating end of life treatment. And while it is still a recent development, good deaths have
begun to incorporate the presence of hospitals—locations which pre-coalition frames argued
prolonged suffering and unnecessary treatment (i.e. bad deaths). In this way, right-to-die frames
have increasingly foregrounded mainstream medical standards and infrastructure at the end of
life. New right-to-die frames therefore emphasize that PAS is fully compatible with existing
medical interests and standards—ultimately facilitating the key medical alliances that emerged
from media releases: (1) presentations on clinical practice guidelines for end of life care with the
Vermont Ethics Network and (2) the partnership with the extensively connected California
Primary Care Association alongside the Doc2Doc service.
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Right-to-Life Frames
A Stable Disability Rights Framework
As I described in the introduction, right-to-life organizations represent a unique negative case
to compare with right-to-die groups. This is because while right-to-die frames have changed
considerably over time, right-to-life frames have remained stable. Their framing of PAS has
consistently centered around an understanding that whether a person thinks or feels their life is
worth living, is dependent on how society treats them. And if society views people with
disability and terminal illness as burdens or valueless, then they would be unfairly pressured to
feel the same way. For this reason, right-to-life organizations contend that PAS legislation is just
the first step on the slippery-slope of state-sanctioned euthanasia. They argue that despite the
protections offered by death with dignity legislation, those with disability, the vulnerable, and
those with terminal illness will effectively be denied adequate healthcare access and pressured by
society (either overtly or covertly) to choose PAS. And from my coding of right-to-life media
releases, that core disability rights argument is the same today as it was in 1996.
Again, in contrast to the right-to-die movement right-to-life organizations have experienced
relatively little outside pressure to innovate their frames—they are in fact successfully resisting
PAS which is still not legal in 43 U.S. states. And though the right-to-die movement clearly
reacted to both the 2006 Supreme Court ruling and to PAS neutrality among key medical
organizations, the right-to-life movement has evidenced a reluctance to engage in broader
coalition activity. Significantly, they were the only ones to contain media releases which
documented their outright rejection of potential partnerships with outside organizations. Still,
right-to-life groups did often refer to their broad network of coalitions:
“In the 12 years since Oregon legalized PAS, not one state has followed suit despite
repeated attempts by activists. For this latest [right-to-die] attempt in Vermont, a sizable
war chest was used to hire a field director and professional lobbyists, and to conduct an
expensive opinion poll. Local media coverage, by and large, was already favorable to
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their cause. But, in the end, a dedicated, broad-based opposition coalition consisting of -medical, disability rights, and suicide prevention organizations-- managed to put an end
to activists’ hopes of bringing PAS to the East Coast, at least for now.” (2006)
“DREDF [Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund] is pleased to announce, along
with our coalition partners in Californians Against Assisted Suicide, that this week, the
national organization Patients Rights Action Fund will launch a new web page where
concerned individuals, family members, and friends can bring to light abuses, problems,
and complications associated with assisted suicide laws.” (2016)
“ADAPT is a grassroots disability rights organization with chapters in 30 states. It uses
nonviolent direct action in order to bring attention and awareness to the lack of civil
rights the disability community experiences. Not Dead Yet is a national, grassroots
disability rights group that opposes legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia as
deadly forms of discrimination against old, ill and disabled people. Not Dead Yet helps
organize and articulate opposition to these practices based on secular social justice
arguments.” (2016)

But regardless of the claims to broad networks of coalitions, right-to-life frames persistently
focused on a single disability rights concern and media releases that were sampled did not
capture substantive descriptions of coalition activity among organizations outside of right-to-life
groups8. Instead of coalition activity though, 49 of the 100 media releases I coded described how
the real issue in legalizing PAS was that it devalued the physically disabled and vulnerable, and
another 59 releases emphasized that PAS under a broken medical system would mean patients
could never again trust their healthcare providers.
The first sampled media release for the right-to-life movement described how the core
mission of the then new social movement organization, Not Dead Yet (NDY), was a direct
response to the growing acceptance of PAS. They argued that this had very fatal consequences

8

On this point, while PAS legislative failures may have been described as successful coalition activity involving
‘many grassroots’ or broad-based organizations, who ultimately framed the issue for the public convincingly,
media releases did not evidence specific coalition events, conferences, etc. among specifically named
organizations. The caveat once again is that right-to-life groups often referred to ‘broad coalitions’ among many
types of organizations (medical included), but did not name specific groups or coalition activity outside of antieuthanasia, ant-PAS, and disability rights groups (right-to-life organizations).
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for those with disability:
“Called NOT DEAD YET!, it was created in response to the growing popularity of
physician assisted suicides in this country. Many people fear that this slippery slope could
lead to the systematic extermination of people with disabilities.” (1996: emphasis in
original)
This slippery-slope argument and its associated fear for the forced death of those with disability,
extends well into the mid-2000s:
“Two activists in wheelchairs, Duane French of Lacey and Joelle Brouner of Olympia,
spoke against the law in a news conference that followed the one featuring Gardner.
French and Brouner said the law could create a coercion for some disabled people who
are faced with difficulty getting palliative, or non-curative, care. French said some could
be pressured by family or by economic forces into taking their lives.” (2008)
“We disabled people, whose lives frequently look like the lives of people requesting
suicide,do not feel that our dignity is compromised because we depend on others for
physical care, or because we are not continent every hour of every day [sic].” (2008)
And today, the same message is still articulated:
“‘NDY’s primary legal argument against assisted suicide laws is that they discriminate by
giving some people suicide prevention and others suicide assistance based on illness and
disability in violation of the ADA,’ said Diane Coleman, president and CEO of Not Dead
Yet.” (2018)

Bad Deaths
But as a critical point of departure from right-to-die media releases, right-to-life depictions of
‘bad deaths’ represented nearly half (44) of all media releases. In contrast, one-tenth of right-tolife media releases portrayed some instance of death as ‘good.’ For comparison, nearly half of all
right-to-die media releases (49) described particular instances of death as ‘good,’ and nearly onequarter (20) were depicted as ‘bad.’ The reason for this inversion may be linked to movementcountermovement processes (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996), where right-to-die frames of good
death are deconstructed and resituated by right-to-life groups as bad death.
But, right-to-life framing of ‘bad’ deaths particularly focused on undermining medical
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patronage by emphasizing the uncertainty of medical evaluations to determine who ‘terminal’
patients are. And bad deaths questioned medical professionals’ ability to avoid prejudice against
vulnerable populations—important concerns when PAS laws grant increasing authority and
power to medical professionals:
“When asked how this woman or the other two patients could be considered “terminally ill,”
Holden explained, “The definition of terminally ill, of course, is six months or less, and we
knew that all three of these patients would die in six months or less if they stopped eating.”
Thus, the patients were judged to be terminally ill.” (1998)
“In May, Barbara Wagner, 64, found out that her lung cancer had returned after two years of
being in remission. Her oncologist prescribed the drug Tarceva because, he told her, it could
extend her life by slowing the cancer’s progression. But, her health care insurer, the Oregon
Health Plan…refused to pay the drug’s $4,000-a-month price tag. According to the unsigned
letter she received from the plan, ‘Treatment of advanced cancer that is meant to prolong life,
or change the course of this disease, is not a covered benefit of the Oregon Health Plan.’
What the letter said it would cover, however, is palliative or comfort care that, includes
physician-assisted suicide” (2008)
“As we’ve seen over the past few decades, narrow initiatives like this act as door-openers, in
which a narrowly-defined ‘refusal’ of life-sustaining treatment expands over time both in
terms of the groups who may exercise this ‘right’ and the level of proof a surrogate needs to
‘exercise’ that right on the behalf of someone who cannot communicate those wishes
themselves. What makes this initiative a bold step is that it shifts manual assistance in eating
and drinking as a form of medical assistance --a radical difference in framing something that
has historically viewed as basic care.” (2018)
Right-to-life frames also stressed that family and friends could work against the interests of
terminal patients with the help of disinterested physicians. In these case, fatal prescriptions could
be filled for medically unnecessary conditions. While right-to-die groups painted the
quintessential picture of a PAS death involving friends and family celebrating together just
before they peacefully fall asleep, right-to-life groups framed these situations in more abusive
terms:
“It’s been a year since my uncle opted for assisted suicide. To me it’s an excruciating
anniversary. He talked about this for a year before it became law. He’d had surgery for
cancer which left him with a catheter. He was depressed at 94 but was home with assistance
from friends and health givers. I thought this could never happen because he was just old
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and depressed. When the law became reality, friends helped him with his quest. They took
him to doctors that my uncle convinced this was what he wanted. His profession had been
car salesman so he got the doctors to sign off on him. Friends who were his caretakers tried
to talk him out of it, saying it wasn’t right because he wasn’t terminal. The date was set for
the final event. I loved him and wanted to be with him when he died. It felt like an execution.”
(2010)

In many of the media releases, right-to-life organizations were critical of associating
optimism with PAS while a broken medical system specifically discriminates against those with
disabilities. One of the very first right-to-life releases is illustrative:
“Hard to imagine [widespread murder of those with disabilities] in a country that has the
strongest civil rights protections for people with disabilities in the world? Well consider
what is taking place in our country…
2. Increased use of cost-benefit vs quality-of-life analyses of the lives of people with
disabilities.
3. Frequent interpretation in managed care, as a method to "control" health care costs, of
people with disabilities' needs as too expensive.
4. Expansion of attempts to eliminate guarantees and minimum standards in the Medicaid
program.
5. Growth of attacks, based on fears about the cost of our civil rights, against Americans
with disabilities.” (1996)
Right-to-life frames also often emphasized the destructive combination of a broken medical
system with PAS legislation. Releases highlighted the effect on the largest disabled community,
the elderly:
“There are other ways to promote the premature deaths of old, ill and disabled people
other than assisted suicide, euthanasia, and ‘futility’ policies. One way is to chop away at
their health care. (2008)
“A major concern among disability groups is the risk of abuse of elders and people with
disabilities. ‘The clearest explanation that I’ve heard about the problems with abuse in the
context of assisted suicide come from elder law attorney, Margaret Dore,’ says Coleman.
‘Margaret calls assisted suicide laws a ‘recipe for elder abuse.’” (2013)

These frames continue to today, focusing attention on widespread elder abuse and the murder of
the disability community, which PAS only ensures under the American healthcare system:
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“‘The legalization of assisted suicide puts me and others with disabilities at risk’, said
Anita Cameron, one of the organizers of the protest, and a member of Not Dead Yet.
‘Due to our flawed health care system, it costs much less to kill me than to care for me.
I’m at higher risk of abuse and coercion, so my ‘right’ to die evolves into my duty to
die.” (2014)
“Why are they opposed? This is not about people’s option to commit suicide, which is not
illegal. This is about how the health care system upon which we all depend responds to a
person who says they want society’s agreement with their suicide and the means to do it.
We are worried about health care cost-cutting pressures. Assisted suicide by doctors is a
deadly mix in a profit-driven health care system.We are also worried about putting lethal
drugs in the home of a seriously ill person in a society where one in 10 elders are abused,
mostly by family. The claim that there are ‘safeguards’ doesn’t make it so.” (2016)
The consistency of these themes was a surprising finding in comparison to the right-to-die media
releases. Whether PAS was a fatal recipe, or a symptom of widespread discrimination, the
message remains principally the same: PAS legislation is a slippery slope toward the systematic
elimination of those with disabilities and the vulnerable, because medical professionals cannot be
trusted when healthcare is not evenly distributed. In reframing death and dying, one media
release summarizes the principle aim of the right-to-life movement:
“Personal assistance services are funded by Medicaid and they are the kind of long term care
that keeps people out of nursing facilities so they can enjoy basic freedoms like everyone
else. But Medicaid still forces too many people into nursing facilities against their will. It’s
time to start saving money, not by cutting Medicaid, but by reforming it to reverse the
institutional bias. I’ve heard people say they’d rather die than go to a nursing home. It’s not
a home and no one should be locked up in one because they live in a state that doesn’t offer
the choice of Medicaid personal assistance in a person’s real home. And no one should have
to die because of Medicaid cuts that deny them basic health care. We’re going to fight to
protect Medicaid. It’s a life and death issue and we’re Not Dead Yet!” (2011)

Identity and Framing
Two media releases provide some indications for why right-to-life frames have changed very
little over the past two decades. In the first release, right-to-life advocates elaborate on a decision
to proactively reject partnering with an organization called the Family Research Council (FRC).
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The right-to-life group, Not Dead Yet (NDY), detailed how the FRC sent out invitations to
discuss coalition options with two other disability rights groups: the National Council on
Independent Living and Second Thoughts. NDY and the Disability Rights Education & Defense
Fund (DREDF) were two prominent disability rights groups who were not extended invitations.
In responding to their exclusion, NDY wrote:
“We’ve had a lot of practice, them and us [already formed disability coalition], leaving
our disagreements at the door. We agree that legalizing assisted suicide is extremely
dangerous public policy for old, ill and disabled people, including the general public in
ways people often don’t recognize.But this invitation from the Family Research Council
(FRC) is different. There was no advance contact with the most active disability groups
on the issue. In contrast, new coalitions were already forming in Maryland, Pennsylvania
and Colorado, but those groups came together through careful outreach, preparation and
mutually agreed ground rules. Face to face meetings, if any, should be held in a neutral
setting such as a hotel. None of this happened with FRC, yet our disability rights
colleagues who received this invitation would have no way of knowing that.” (2015)
The fact that DREDF and NDY had not received coalition invitations appeared to have
primarily offended both groups, who saw themselves as the leading disability organizations for
opposing PAS. But their offense was just one facet of a much more fundamental concern—it also
represented a threat to right-to-life framing strategies. What’s more, the right-to-life group also
sent out official letters to all of the disability rights groups that received FRC invitations. In these
letters, they describe why organizations like the FRC interferes with disability rights frames:
“We have heard from a few folks in the disability community who have received the
invitation below from the Family Research Council (FRC). FRC did not engage in any
preliminary planning with NDY or DREDF, nor even notify us of this effort. Sending the
message from FRC and holding the proposed meeting at FRC’s offices indicates a
serious failure to recognize how it undermines the real coalitions that already exist or
are forming, and threatens to paint opposition to assisted suicide laws as connected with
the other policy positions that FRC is known for. We hope that disability advocates will
not RSVP and will instead put energy into the genuine broad-based coalitions that are
working to oppose assisted suicide bills in the states where they are being introduced. We
would be glad to help you connect with them.” (2015)
This case reveals that right-to-life groups have asserted their political influence to position
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themselves as the guides to more ‘genuine’ anti-PAS social movement activity. As their reaction
to the FRC indicates, maintaining control of right-to-life frames has been a fundamental concern
for right-to-life groups. But more critically, by constraining their framing of PAS to a singular
disability rights issue, they have blocked opportunities to build coalitions with outside
organizations. To emphasize this point, the right-to-life release more explicitly described their
concern for engaging in coalitions with outside organizations:
“Every major national disability group that has taken a position on assisted suicide
opposes these laws due to the dangers of mistake, coercion and abuse. But C&C
[Compassion & Choices] is out there claiming that their only real opposition comes from
the religious right, and promoting opinion pieces from two disabled individuals who
agree with them. One reporter even pressed upon one of NDY’s LGBT Board members
that she must be a closet conservative. Enough already.
Disability organizations, like policy makers, have a duty to consider the risks that
proposed laws pose to everyone, not just a few... All of these mean that we cannot sit by
silently while assisted suicide bills are falsely marketed as a progressive social cause.
We’re willing to work with medical, palliative care, hospice, religious and pro-life
organizations in broad coalition to defeat these bills, but coalition presumes equity, good
faith and an ability for all members to keep their eyes on the prize. Sadly, we don’t see
that in FRC.” (2015)
And according to the same release, at least one other disability rights organization withdrew their
participation in solidarity, noting that FRC “was a bridge too far.”
Two aspects of this right-to-life coalition rejection are critical: (1) that right-to-life
organizations evaluate coalition work by its alignment with a disability rights framework and (2)
that right-to-life organizations prioritize movement frames that highlight “medical mistakes,
medical devaluation of [disability] lives…and abuse” (2015). And in a media release eight
months after the rejection of FRC coalition work, one right-to-life group once again separated
their movement from the interests of the religious right:
“…opponents told the media that we should be dismissed as mere “puppets” of the
religious right. As our voices grew and that strategy worked less and less, we were
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dismissed as having unreasonable fears, unsupported by the facts. But the reality is that
we live on the front lines of a health care system, with long term health issues that give us
a better informed perspective on the weaknesses of that system and the ways that it too
often fails to meet its stated goals.” (2015)

Ultimately, right-to-life media releases suggested that the stability of their movement frames
was heavily influenced by a disability rights identity. Right-to-life organizations consistently
focused frames around firsthand experiences with disability, and disability discrimination in the
delivery of medical care. These frames represented singular and essential concerns for right-todie groups in preventing PAS legislation from passing. And in the interest of protecting that core
disability rights framework, right-to-life groups have been willing to reject coalition
opportunities. Right-to-life media releases underscore the unique and important role that identity
can play in how social movement frames change, or don’t change, over time.
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VI. Discussion/Conclusion
This paper has explored how frames have changed over time for two assisted suicide social
movements—the right-to-die and the right-to-life. The findings have been based on the content
analysis of 200 randomly sampled media releases that span 23 years (1995-2018) of social
movement activity.

Right-to-Die Frames and Coalition Activity
The major right-to-die organizations have profoundly changed their framing of PAS in
response to a key external pressure: the 2006 Supreme Court ruling, Gonzales v. Oregon. As I
have shown, the court decision provided a unique protection for PAS legislation that right-to-die
groups took hold of by aligning frames with the interests of medical organizations. They
accomplished this in two ways: (1) by resituating PAS to be compatible with existing end of life
options, and (2) diminishing the importance of using PAS and relegating it to an option of lastresort. These transformations in framing were supported by the changing right-to-die ascriptions
of death. Good deaths before the Supreme Court ruling highlighted greater freedom at the end of
life: they could determine for themselves when illness or disability were tolerable, maintain their
dignity, and resist medical authority. But following Gonzales v. Oregon, a good death reflected
the changing coalition interests of the right-to-die movement. It therefore depicted positive
experiences in death and dying involving partnerships between patients and their doctors, an
engagement with all end of life options before considering PAS, and most recently, hospitals.
Coalitions among right-to-die organizations highlight how framing activity in social
movements is not always determined by a need to mobilize potential activists. The 2006
Supreme Court decision indicates that in the case of the right-to-die movement, it was a critical
external event that encouraged organizations to adjust their framing tactics to limit legal and
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political contests. The right-to-die movement is therefore a unique case involving two different
motivating factors for framing dynamics. Before Gonzales v. Oregon, right-to-die frames were
mainly concerned with mobilizing activists and accordingly framed PAS as a necessary civil
liberty amid bad death and dying, at a time when the public was increasingly unsettled by
medical authority (Purvis 2012). Pre-coalition right-to-die framing decisions are generally
consistent with existing social movement scholarship on the topic in this way. But after twelve
years of legal setbacks and Supreme Court resistance to pre-coalition right-to-die frames,
Gonzales v. Oregon represented a new opportunity for right-to-die groups to establish more
resilient frames. Motivated by this key external event, right-to-die groups modified their
depictions of PAS and death and dying to encourage outside partnerships with the ‘medical
regimes’ that the 2006 Supreme Court opinion identified as critical to the legitimacy of PAS as a
medical treatment.

Right-to-Life Frames and Coalition Resistance
The right-to-life movement represents a significant negative case in the face of right-to-die
frame dynamics. Right-to-life organizations have generally maintained a singular frame for over
two decades. As I have illustrated, they contend that PAS accentuates discrimination against the
vulnerable and those with disability, especially when it is provided by a broken healthcare
system. Right-to-life depictions of bad deaths involving exceptional abuse and coercion to push
PAS in medically unnecessary circumstances, along with the overwhelming absence of what
might constitute a good death, underscores these organizations’ insistence that medical
professionals should have no authority over death and dying. Right-to-life media releases also
indicated that coalitions with external organizations have been rejected by right-to-life groups,
who have been deeply concerned with how external alliances could undermine existing disability
rights frames. I have shown that two factors are ultimately responsible for the right-to-life
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movement’s framing path: (1) the absence of external events motivating the reformation of
movement frames, and (2) the stability afforded by a core social movement identity.
It is also interesting to consider that right-to-life frames have articulated a position on
medical authority consistent with pre-coalition right-to-die frames. And some scholars have
argued that right-to-die organizations represent a resistance to medical interpretations of death
and dying and promote alternative paradigms to approaching the end of life (Timmermans 2005;
Hillyard and Dombrink 2001). But media releases in this study suggest that such an account of
the right-to-die movement is no longer true. In light of the increasingly convergent interests of
PAS with mainstream medical groups, right-to-die frames now articulate PAS as yet another
example of medicalization, as some scholars have noted in other contexts (Karsoho et al 2016).
This case therefore has clear implications for research on the social construction of death and
dying and resistance to medicalization, topics which are paramount in medical sociology.

Conclusion
As with any research endeavor, limitations are an unavoidable aspect of any methodology
that is used. Like most qualitative work, one of the main concerns with using media releases
from a discrete set of community organizations is how representative they are. The seven
organizations investigated in this paper do not encompass all of the groups involved in opposing
or supporting PAS legislation and they do not include all of the political and individual members
in the U.S. that participate in the process of constructing right-to-die and right-to-life movement
frames. In this way, this study cannot fully represent the PAS social movement as a whole.
However, these PAS organizations do represent the largest and most politically active
communities and are arguably the most influential sites of contentious movement framing in
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public media for PAS. For this reason, it is argued that these sources provide reliable and
representative data.
The present research has primarily contributed to sociological knowledge of how and why
social movement frames change over time. While some scholarship on coalitions and framing
has suggested that social movement frames reconstitute as a lowest common denominator
(Magan 2008), this research supports an alternative route in some cases. Social movements at
times may also widely adopt hegemonic frameworks wholesale (e.g. medical), in the interest of
responding to new opportunities for success provided by key external events. In addition, this
research also contributes to sociological research on physician assisted suicide from integrated
social movement and medical sociology perspectives. And this study is the first, to the author’s
knowledge, that investigates both the role of coalitions and identity in PAS social movements,
and how coalition activity is influenced by changes in social movement frames over time. Future
research should attempt to develop more generalizable research on how PAS social movement
frames have changed over time, as well as how medical institutions have responded to and
shaped their frames. Lastly, continued research on PAS might also focus on understanding this
issue through the people who participate in right-to-die and right-to-life organizations, both
through interviews and internal documents. That kind of research might hope to uncover how
members of PAS organizations have understood movement goals and frames over time, and to
what extant external factors and personal identity may have influenced participation in activism
and influenced leadership decision-making.
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Appendix
Table A
Coalition Event

Date

Merging of Compassion In Dying and End of Life Choices

2005

Partnership with Vermont Ethics Network

2014

Partnership with California Primary Care Association and
development of Compassion & Choices Doc2Doc Service

2015

Table B
Major PAS Legislation by U.S. State
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Measure 16 (Passed)
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Measure 51 (Repeal Bill
Failed)
Washington Death With Dignity Act, Initiative 1000
Vermont Act 39 Patient Choice At End of Life
California Assemble Bill No 15. End of Life Option Act
Colorado Proposition 106 End of Life Option Act
Washington D.C. Law 21-182 Death With Dignity Act of
2016
Hawaii HB No.2739 Our Care, Our Choice Act

Date Approved
November 8th, 1994
November 4th, 1997
November 4th, 2008
May 20th, 2013
October 5th, 2015
November 8th, 2016
February 18, 2017
April 5th, 2018
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